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Abstract
Previous models of international conflict have suffered two shortfalls. They tended not to embody
dynamic changes, focusing rather on static slices of behavior over time. These models have also
been empirically evaluated in ways that assumed the independence of each country, when in reality
they are searching for the interdependence among all countries. We illustrate a solution to these
two hurdles and evaluate this new, dynamic, network based approach to the dependencies among
the ebb and flow of daily international interactions using a newly developed, and openly available,
database of events among nations.
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1. Motivation
Gartzke & Westerwinter (2014) provide a
recent paragon of research design in the field
of international relations. In this research, they
examine how expected changes in the distri-
bution of power affects incentives for the so-
called rising powers to sculpt their policies, so
that they are more aggressive when they ex-
pect to be more powerful. At the same time,
their argument states that countries have an in-
creased incentive to undertake conflict now if
they are currently more dominant than they
can expect to be in the future. This notion
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leads to an expectation of preventative war as a
consequence of power transition (Levy, 1987).
Three hypotheses are generated: (a) shifts in
military power among similar states are less
likely to generate onsets of international con-
flict than shifts among dissimilar states, (b)
military shifts among those countries with di-
rect diplomatic relationships are not threaten-
ing and do not lead to the onset of international
conflicts, and (c) changes among balances in
military and economic power in states that
are central in the international diplomatic net-
work are more pertinent for war and peace than
are the relative characteristics of non-central
states.
The research design for the (Gartzke &
Westerwinter, 2014) study is canonical by cur-
rent standards in 2015. It takes a population
of state dyads – pairs of countries, such as
the United States and Canada – over the pe-
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riod from 1950 until 2000. This results in
approximately 1.5 × 106 dyadic observations,
though often they are treated as though the re-
lationship in each dyad is symmetric, which
reduces this number by half. The dependent
variable is binary and has a value of 1 in
each year in which an international war be-
gins, and otherwise is 0. This variable is non-
zero only in a very small number instances,
out of the one and one-half million observa-
tions. The independent variables are created
such that they, also, are expressed dyadically,
even if they are really characteristics of indi-
vidual states. Specifically, military capabili-
ties are observed in each country and the dif-
ference in military capabilities within a dyad
is used as a measure of military balance within
the dyad.1 Other putatively independent vari-
ables are created in a similar way, by a com-
parison of the values held by each country.
These include measures of voting similarity,
the joint diplomatic centrality of the dyad, and
others. Additionally, economic dependence is
measured as the lower of the trade-to-GDP ra-
tios of the two countries in the dyad. In this
way, dyadic measures are created from the at-
tributes of each country. This idea is long-
standing in the international relations litera-
ture, perhaps stemming from the idea, which
is also included in Gartzke and Westerwinter,
of creating a dyadic score for democracy by
taking the lower democracy score within the
dyad as a characteristic of the jointness of the
level of democracy.
These data are essentially dyadic, but
unconnected across the various times at
which they are measured. Thus, the 1950
US→Canada dyad is not linked in any way
to the same dyad measured in 1951 or 1991.
The dyads are also not connected to similar
1It is actually the expected difference where expec-
tations are generated by trend extrapolation.
or even neighboring dyads. The 1950 dyad of
US→Canada is independent of the 1950 dyad
between the US→Mexico, despite sharing the
US as one of the nodes. Succinctly, each dyad
is assumed in empirical estimations to be in-
dependent of every other dyad. If this is a cor-
rect assumption—and it is not—then using a
simple regression framework will reveal use-
ful information about the relations among the
independent and the dependent variable. Such
a regression table is what is provided in the
canonical example. Table 1 in the Gartzke &
Westerwinter manuscript (page 10) shows that
in a logistic regression expected changes in ca-
pabilities have a positive influence on the prob-
ability of a war onset and the measure of inter-
est similarity has a strong but negative impact
on war onset. The respective coefficients are
large, and their respective standard errors are
small. The putative statistical significance of
these coefficients is asserted to support the un-
derlying hypotheses.2
The formal representation of this data struc-
ture is given by a time series of vectors com-
prising the measured dyadic relations at each
point in time; for each dyad i → j and time t,
yi, j,t denote the relation of the dyad at that time.
The total structure has size m × (m − 1) × n,
where m is the number of countries and n is
the number of time periods, and could be re-
lated to other similarly defined structures for
other variables that might serve as covariates,
as in the case of the democratic peace litera-
ture, or in the Gartzke and Westerwinter ex-
ample, above. Such a structure doesn’t neces-
sarily preserve, but rather generally destroys,
the dependencies among the nodes and across
time.
It is worth noting that this basic research de-
sign is well established, and largely unchanged
2We ignore for this discussion the use of inferential
statistics in a population.
2
since the 1980s. Examples of virtually the
same design – using virtually the same data
– include Maoz & Abdolali (1989), Bremer
(1992), Maoz & Russett (1993), Bremer & Cu-
sack (1995), and Pevehouse & Russett (2006),
as well as many, many others. Moreover, the
same database has been utilized in most of
these studies, and while it has been updated
since the 1980s virtually all quantitative re-
search on international conflict and coopera-
tion at the dyadic level has used the same,
canonical database: the Militarized Interstate
Dispute data that were initially created by the
Correlates of War project in the 1980s (Palmer
et al., 2015). Thus these data and this research
design have been a constant of research over
the past several decades. What is clear is that
it is hard to underestimate the resilience of
the standard regression framework in spite of
demonstrations that it can lead to faulty con-
clusions in the presence of higher-order depen-
dencies in dyadic data structures: Hoff et al.
(2002); Hoff & Ward (2004); Hoff (2005);
Hoff (201). See also Cranmer & Desmarais
(2011), Desmarais & Cranmer (2012), Cran-
mer et al. (2012), and Snijders et al. (2012). A
nice summary and additional development can
be found in Stewart (2014).
Below we outline a different approach to the
regression framework that embraces the de-
pendency across actors as well as over time,
permitting a regression based approach to es-
timating the parameters of dynamic networks
of political actors. We then apply this to a new
dyadic database, which is completely indepen-
dent of the COW MID data, on conflict and
cooperative events among countries.
2. Modeling Approach
Let relational data that is longitudinal be
represented as a series of matrices {Yt : t =
1, . . . n}, with each Yt representing the actions
or flows between the pairs of actors, in our case
countries, at time t. That is, Yt is the m×m ma-
trix whose (i, j)th entry is yi, j,t, the measured
interaction between actors i and j at time t. If
these data are binary – such as onsets of war
or militarized disputes – this is a different but
equivalent representation of the canonical data
in the quantitative study of war, as in the case
of Gartzke and Westerwinter (2014). But such
binary data are also considered by a different
research tradition to represent networks. One
such matrix Yt is shown in Figure 1. Here at
time t country i has initiated disputes with j
and k, and k has initiated a dispute with i.
Yt =

i . . . j . . . k
i 0 . . . 1 . . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
j 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
k 1 . . . 0 . . . 0

Figure 1. Adjacency matrix representation of a
dyadic, relational measure for one time point.
Snijders (2001) developed an agent based
approach to modeling such binary networks
that considers the linkages among the actors
in terms of decisions, such that utility models
could be implemented to generate the linkages.
This strategy does enable the specification of
a variety of network dynamics that may exist
in the data, but the decision logic is homoge-
neous, with the same utility applying to each
actor. Current versions of this approach are
perhaps better known as Jackson-Wohlensky
networks, though the estimation of the param-
eters is typically given, rather than estimated.
An alternative approach has been to spec-
ify dynamic latent variables, in which each Yt
is modeled as a function of actor specific la-
tent variables. The goal of this approach is to
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collapse information contained in the network
about higher-order dependencies to a lower di-
mensional latent space. Embedding the net-
work information onto this lower dimensional
space has the added benefit of providing mean-
ingful visualizations of how likely actors are to
interact with each other due to network influ-
ences. This approach was first introduced in
the political science literature by Ward & Hoff
(2007) and expanded by Ward et al. (2012),
and has been widely employed. Similar, recent
approaches include Durante & Dunson (2014).
Common to each of these approaches is an
effort to account for higher-order dependen-
cies that can emerge in network data. Exam-
ples of these dependencies include concepts
such as reciprocity and transitivity that are fa-
miliar to the international relations literature.
Broadly, these dependencies can be placed
along two dimensions: second and third-order
dependencies.
Second-order dependencies refer to what is
often described as reciprocity in the context of
directed relationships. Reciprocity is a not a
new concept to the field of international stud-
ies; it has its roots in previous theories of co-
operation and the evolution of norms between
states (Richardson, 1960; Choucri & North,
1972; Ward, 1981; Cusack & Ward, 1981;
Ward, 1984; Goldstein, 1991). This concept
has particular relevance in the conflict litera-
ture, as we would expect that if, for instance,
Iran behaved aggressively towards Saudi Ara-
bia that this would induce Saudi Arabia to be-
have aggressively in return. The prevalence
of these types of potential interactions within
directed dyadic data structures directly chal-
lenges the basic assumption of observational
independence.
An example of a third-order dependency is
transitivity, which follows the familiar logic of
“a friend of a friend is a friend”. The impor-
tance of these types of relationship is being in-
creasingly recognized in the literature as well
(see, for example, Lai, 1995; Manger et al.,
2012; Kinne, 2013). In binary data, transitiv-
ity describes the dependence among three ac-
tors i, j, k in which i and j are more likely
to be linked if linkages already exist between
i− k and j− k. The principal idea behind these
dependencies is that knowing something about
the relationships between i − k and j − k may
reveal information about the relationship be-
tween i − j, even if it is not directly observed.
This type of network dynamic might be partic-
ularly important for understanding the devel-
opment of cooperative relationships. The con-
sequence of not incorporating this type of de-
pendency into our modeling framework is the
same as above, and, as a result our models, will
suffer from misspecification bias and will be
more likely to result in type 1 errors.
While both the agent and latent space ap-
proaches effectively incorporate statistical in-
terdependence among the actors, agent-based
approaches assume that this effect is homoge-
neous among all dyads. The latent variable
based approach allows heterogeneity between
dyads. The downside, however, of earlier work
using the latter approach is that explicit pa-
rameterizations of the effect of reciprocity and
transitivity could not be calculated due to the
simple structure of the latent variables. Instead
all of the information contained within those
higher order dependences was collapsed into
a lower dimensional latent space. Hoff (2014)
provides a novel approach that combines both
of these approaches in terms of their strengths:
it has an explicit representation of the depen-
dence, specifically, reciprocity and transitivity,
between dyads, but also allows for heterogene-
ity among nodes.
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3. Tensor Model
For many dyadic, relational data in interna-
tional relations we do not have just a snapshot
of interactions in time, but an actual time se-
ries of observations. Say that (yt) represents a
time series of vectors representing the dyadic
interactions for m countries through the period
t = 1, . . . , n, so that yt ∈ Rm2 (this is just the
matrix Yt rewritten as a vector). A simple way
to model the evolution of this time series is as a
function of past behavior. A modeling frame-
work that lends itself to this type of set up is a
vector autoregression (VAR) model. The VAR
model has been employed in macroeconomic
research ever since Sims (1980) introduced the
approach, and it remains a useful tool for po-
litical scientists, as evidenced by the work of
Brandt & Freeman (2006). The VAR model is
a generalization of the univariate autoregres-
sive model that accounts for linear interdepen-
dencies among multiple time series. The ben-
efit of this approach is that it models a set of
time series as resulting from a dynamic and
endogenous process, rather than imposing a
priori assumptions of exogeneity between the
various explanatory variables.
A first-order VAR model posits that:
yt = Θyt−1 + et (1)
E[et] = 0 (2)
E[eteTs ] =
Σ if t = s,0 otherwise (3)
where yt has been demeaned to eliminate in-
tercepts such that
∑
t yi, j,t/n ≡ 0. This is easy
to estimate, but has extreme data requirements
since Θ has m4 entries. One basic solution to
this is to use a bilinear model such that the re-
gression matrix is given by Θ = B ⊗ A, where
⊗ is the Kronecker product. As a result of this
specification we obtain a basic specification
that looks relatively familiar: Yt = AYt−1BT .
In terms of this formulation we
have, for each i and j, E[yi, j,t|Yt−1] =∑
i′
∑
j′ ai,i′b j, j′yi′, j′,t−1, which makes clear that
the regression parameters are multiplicative
functions of the basic bilinear parameters. The
ai,i′ capture how previous actions of i′ affect
i and b j, j′ shows how actions that target j are
influenced by prior actions toward j′.
Given that we are interested in estimating
the endogenous relationships between how a
set of network variables about the interactions
of states evolve over time, it will be useful
to quickly go over how the data we are mod-
eling is structured. Recall that in Figure 1,
the matrix contains a snapshot of interactions
on a particular dimension occurring between
a set of m actors at a given point in time.
Now we are moving to a setting through which
we can estimate how a network evolves over
time, thus we have a time series of matrices
{Yt : t = 1, . . . , n}. Additionally, we want to
estimate a model in which we are not required
to make a priori assumptions about exogeneity
among our covariates, so we employ a mod-
eling framework that allows us to model the
endogenous effects of a set of v relational co-
variates over time.
Thus the data that we are modeling no
longer takes the shape of a simple series of
two dimensional matrices, but instead should
be thought of as a multiway array or tensor,
Y, of dimension m × m × v × n, where m cor-
responds to the number of countries, v to the
number of variables, and n to the number of
time periods. Figure 2 provides an example of
this for the simple case of four countries, three
time points, and two relational measures.
Now take Yt to be the time t component of
Y (so now, instead of an m×m matrix, a tensor
incorporating each of the v variables). The re-
gression problem then becomes one of regress-
ing the relational tensor Yt from time t on the
tensor Xt = Yt−1 from time t − 1 in a parsimo-
5
Figure 2. Tensor representation of longitu-
dinal dyadic, representational measures. The
green and blue colors represent different rela-
tional measures and darker shading indicates
later time periods. Specifically, we show a ten-
sor with dimensions of 4 × 4 × 2 × 3, where
4 represents the number of actors, 2 the num-
ber of relational measures, and 3 the number
of time points.
nious way. Hoff (2014) proposes and develops
the following multilinear generalization of the
bilinear regression model:
Y = X × {B1ii′ ,B2ii′ ,B3} + E, (4)
where “×” is a multilinear operator known as
the “Tucker product”. Here Y and X are m ×
m×v×n tensors and each entry for X is lagged
by one period.
In this model B1ii′ and B2ii′ are m×m matri-
ces of regressions coefficients, and are similar
to the parameters A and B, respectively, dis-
cussed above. The key difference, however, is
that we are no longer running separate models
for every v; rather we are leveraging each of
the v dyadic, relational variables to help pre-
dict the others. Thus B1ii′ and B2ii′ represent
how previous actions along any of the v param-
eters affects future interactions. For example,
the l j coefficient in B1ii′ measures the effect of
an interaction from actor j to actor k along any
of the v parameters on the likelihood of an in-
teraction from l to k, in any of the parameters,
in the next time period.
B3 is a v by v matrix of coefficients repre-
senting the direct effects of the lagged dyadic,
relational parameters on one another. In other
words, the uw coefficient of B3 provides a
measure of the effect of the value of parameter
w in a dyad on the value of parameter u in that
dyad during the next time period. In order to
incorporate explicit representations of higher-
order dependencies we extend the X tensor
along its third dimension.
First, we add in reciprocity, which captures
the tendency for actions to be reciprocated
from one node, i, to another, i′ for a variable w.
More explicitly, if yi,i′,w,t (that is, the i to i′ re-
lationship in variable w at time t) is large, and
reciprocal relationships exist, we would expect
yi′,i,w,t+1 to be large as well. In the formulation
of X we have presented so far, its third dimen-
sion has length equal to v; we add v additional
slices to the tensor along its third mode to in-
corporate reciprocity, so that it now has dimen-
sion m × m × (2 ∗ v) × n. The first v slices
across this third mode are the same as before,
yi,i′,w,t−1, but the last v slices are defined using
the reciprocal lagged elements, yi′,i,w,t−1. The
general form of our tensor regression remains
the same as what was shown in Equation 4,
but now B3 is a v by (2 ∗ v) matrix, in which
the last v columns capture the tendencies of ac-
tions to be reciprocated by other actions at the
next time point.
Next, we add in a measure of transitivity to
account for the possibility of third-order de-
pendencies. An implication of transitivity is
that existing linkages yi,i′′,w,t and yi′,i′′,w,t, im-
ply that yi,i′,w,t+1 may form a linkage as well.
To incorporate this additional term, we again
add v slices to the third mode of our X ten-
sor. The elements of these last v slices are∑
i′′(yi,i′′,w,t + yi′′,i,w,t)(yi′,i′′,w,t + yi′′,i′,w,t). Similar
to when reciprocity was incorporated, B3 now
expands to a v by (3 ∗ v) matrix, in which the
last v columns capture how relations that i and
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i′ share with common targets leads to future
interactions between i and i′′.
The parameters in our completed model for-
mulation have the following dimensions:
• Y: m × m × v × n,
• X: m × m × (3 ∗ v) × n,
• B1ii′ and B2ii′: m × m,
• B3: v × (3 ∗ v),
where m refers to the number of countries,
v the number of relational parameters, and
n the number of time periods. This frame-
work can be referred to as a relational mul-
tilinear regression. Like previous work using
latent spaces to incorporate network charac-
teristics, we are able to model actor hetero-
geneity in the network, however, this frame-
work now also enables the explicit measure-
ment of higher-order dependencies. Hoff
(2014) provides a Bayesian implementation of
this model via Gibbs sampling using semi-
conjugate prior distributions to simulate pa-
rameter values from the corresponding poste-
rior distribution.3
4. ICEWS Dyadic Event Database
We use this modeling framework to estimate
models for verbal and material cooperation
and conflict between states. Information on
these dimensions is collected from the Inte-
grated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS)
event data project. The ICEWS data along
with extensive documentation are available
on dataverse.org (Lautenschlager et al.,
2015; Boschee et al., 2015). The ICEWS
3Code for this Gibbs sampler can be found here:
http://www.stat.washington.edu/people/
pdhoff/Code/hoff_2014/.
event data are constructed by applying natural
language processing techniques based on
natural language processing and graph theory
(Boschee et al., 2013) to a corpus of about
30 million media reports from about 275
local and global news sources in or translated
to English. Each media report is coded in
accordance with an ontology of events that
is derived from the Conflict and Median
Event Observation (CAMEO) ontology
http://eventdata.psu.edu/cameo.dir/
CAMEO.CDB.09b5.pdf.
This results in relevant reports being tagged
as involving a set of actors and by the interac-
tions that took place between them. We choose
to focus on interactions among the top fifty
countries by GDP during time period from
the beginning of 2001 to the end of 2014.
And, like all good social scientists, we use a
2 × 2 table to classify; herein, across the dis-
tinctions between actions and words on the
one hand and conflict and cooperation on the
other. Thus, we aggregate events for this set of
countries and temporal span into the so-called
“quad variables”. Yonamine (2011) provides a
definition for each:
• Verbal Cooperation: The occurrence of
dialogue-based meetings (e.g. negotia-
tions, peace talks), statements that ex-
press a desire to cooperate or appeal for
assistance (other than material aid) from
other actors.
• Material Cooperation: Physical acts of
collaboration or assistance, including re-
ceiving or sending aid, reducing bans and
sentencing, etc.
• Verbal Conflict: A spoken criticism,
threat, or accusation, often related to past
or future potential acts of material con-
flict.
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• Material Conflict: Physical acts of a con-
flictual nature, including armed attacks,
destruction of property, assassination, etc.
Given that the quad variables are generated
using an event data approach, we have a very
low level of temporal aggregation available to
us through which to measure directed interac-
tions between countries. In this analysis, we
focus on the monthly level of aggregation, thus
leaving us with a large time series of directed,
dyadic, relational observations for each quad
variable.
In Figure 3, we show the total number of
event counts falling under each of these vari-
ables at the monthly level. Looking across
the panels we can see that verbal cooperation
events between countries is much more fre-
quent than the other relational variables we
use here. Further, the verbal event variables,
in general, are more frequently occurring than
the material events. This itself may simply re-
flect the fact that verbal actions are less costly
to engage in than material ones, thus they oc-
cur more frequently. Despite this the number
of material conflictual events, that is, events
involving a country engaging in activities such
as imposing a blockade, are not rare. For many
months during the time period shown, the
number of material conflictual events involv-
ing the 50 countries in our analysis exceeded
a 1,000. Material cooperation, on the other
hand, is a much less frequent event within the
context of our sample. This is likely due to
the fact that by design we chose the fifty coun-
tries with the highest average GDPs during the
period of 2001 to 2014, and these countries are
less likely to provide material aid to each other
than they would be to poorer countries.
An important benefit to using these rela-
tional measures is that they display interest-
ing variation over time. Most measures used
in the extant literature to estimate the dyadic
relations between states exhibit relatively little
temporal variation (e.g., MIDs), and, if they
do, they are often not available at low lev-
els of temporal aggregation without substan-
tial loss of country coverage. The quad vari-
ables shown here suffer from neither of those
drawbacks. Thus the addition of these vari-
ables to the set of databases used in political
science research may enable the field to de-
velop a richer understanding of how directed
relationships between states evolve.
An example of how we can trace interest-
ing features of state interaction over time us-
ing these variables is shown in Figure 4. Here
we visualize the directed relations between the
United States and China for the two verbal
quad variables at the monthly level across our
period of analysis. The blue line in the left
panel illustrates verbal cooperative actions that
the United States sent to China, while the red
line designates the same type of actions that
China sent to the United States.
In the case of verbal cooperation, we can
see that the two lines almost completely over-
lap with one another, indicating that many of
these events either occur in tandem or are re-
ciprocated almost immediately. The panel on
verbal conflict shows similar patterns of reci-
procity as verbal cooperation, but unlike coop-
erative interactions between the United States
and China verbal conflictual events are usually
driven to a greater degree by one party or an-
other. For example, in February of 2010, we
can see a peak in the number of verbal conflict-
ual events sent by China to the United States.
This likely was related to the announcement of
an arms sale package to Taiwan by the Obama
administration.
To begin to model the processes driving the
quad variables we turn to the the relational
multilinear regression framework introduced
earlier. We run two separate models. In the
first, we group together the verbal and mate-
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Figure 3. Quad variable counts over time.
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Figure 4. Quad variable counts over time for interactions between the United States and China.
rial conflict variables, and, in the second, the
verbal and material cooperation variables. We
model the processes of cooperation and con-
flict separately in this iteration of the project
to ease the interpretability of the parameter es-
timates. Additionally, if we run a tensor model
using all four of the covariates, as opposed
to running two separate tensor models as sug-
gested above, the model performance notice-
ably declines.
For both models then, this leaves us with a
Y tensor that has dimensions 50×50×2×167,
where 50 corresponds to the number of coun-
tries, 2 to the number of relational variables,
and 167 to the number of months included
in our analysis. Given that we are including
explicit representations of higher-order depen-
dencies, our X tensor has dimensions 50×50×
6 × 167. We also apply a normal quantile-
quantile transformation to the time-series for
every sender-target-variable type triplet and
further centered and scaled each, so that their
empirical distributions are approximately stan-
dard normal.
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5. Results
Figure 5 shows the trace plots after running
8,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler for each
of the six B3 parameter estimates from the co-
operation model. Trace plots for the conflict
model produce results that are similar, in terms
of indicating that the iterative estimation algo-
rithm quickly converged. The starting value
for these Gibbs samplers were the least square
estimates and we can see that each parameter
converges to its stationary distribution almost
immediately. We chose to use the first 1,000
iterations as burn-in, leaving us with 7,000 it-
erations for every parameter through which to
conduct posterior analysis.
Material Cooperation Verbal Cooperation
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Figure 5. Trace plots for each of the six B3 pa-
rameter estimates from the cooperation model.
Different colors correspond to different param-
eter estimates.
5.1. Direct, Reciprocal, & Transitive Effects
The posterior distributions of the B3 coeffi-
cients are summarized in Figure 6. The panel
on the left corresponds to the tensor model
on cooperation and the right to conflict. Also
note that though we split up the verbal and ma-
terial cooperation dependent variables in Fig-
ure 6a, they are estimated simultaneously us-
ing the modeling framework discussed earlier
– the same holds for the conflict model. Ad-
ditionally, given the transformations we made
to the time series for each of our parameters,
the relative importance of our parameters can
be assessed by comparing their coefficient es-
timates.
Along the x-axis of this figure, we list the di-
rect (i j), reciprocal ( ji), and transitive lagged
estimates (i jk) for each variable. The direct es-
timate represents the effect of a particular vari-
able from i to j on the future value of that vari-
able from i to j. The reciprocal estimate desig-
nates the effect of actions from j to i on future
actions from i to j. Last, the transitive estimate
assesses the effect on action between i and k in
the future given that i and j and j and k are
already interacting with one another.
For each of the dyadic, relational variables
examined in Figure 6, the largest estimated
coefficient comes from the direct, lagged pa-
rameter, indicating that the strongest predictor
of relations at a given point a time are what
they were in the period before. For instance,
the regression estimates for the Material Con-
flict variable, shown in the bottom half of Fig-
ure 6b, the parameter estimate for Material
Conflicti j,t−1 is twice as large as that of Verbal
Conflicti j,t−1. This general trend persists for the
predictors of Verbal Conflict and for the results
of the cooperation model.
The lagged effect, however, is not the only
powerful and precise predictor. For both the
cooperation and conflict models, the effect of
both of the direct, lagged variables is precisely
estimated and positive. Thus, for example,
in the case of our model on cooperation, we
find that higher levels of verbal cooperation
between a pair of countries is also likely to
lead to higher levels of material cooperation
and vice versa. The same finding holds for the
parameters measuring the direct effects in the
conflict model.
The results discussed so far correspond to
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Figure 6. Relational multilinear regression results forB3. Darker colors indicate that the coefficient
estimate is significantly different from zero at a 95% credible interval, while lighter the same for
a 90%. Grey indicates that the estimate is not significantly different from zero at either of those
intervals.
the type of parameters that existing latent
space approaches can already estimate. But
the novel component of this new framework
comes with the ability to estimate higher-order
effects for each of these covariates. Thus we
turn to the set of ji parameter estimates in the
panels shown in Figure 6. In every case, we
find that the reciprocal effects are precisely es-
timated for both lagged parameters, and that
there are a number of instances in which the
reciprocal effects are of similar magnitude to
the direct effects. The implication of this,
though potentially not surprising, is that coun-
tries tend to reciprocate behavior. For instance,
in the case of our cooperation model, we find
that material cooperation in a ji pair is likely to
lead to reciprocal material cooperation in the i j
pair in the next period. More interestingly, we
also find evidence in both our models that ver-
bal actions are reciprocated by material ones
and vice versa.
The key implication of these findings for
the reciprocal parameters in our models is that
second-order dependencies have a significant
role to play in our understanding of interac-
tions between states. As noted earlier, ignor-
ing these types of dependencies not only closes
off interesting theoretical avenues of analysis,
but also can lead to inferential mistakes. The
last set of coefficient estimates contained in B3
are the transitive effects of each of the lagged
covariates. We find less support for this par-
ticular type of higher-order dependency in our
analysis. In the conflict models, none of the
parameters used to estimate transitive effects
have an indentifiable role in explaining verbal
or material conflict. In the case of our coop-
eration model, we do find some evidence that
transitivity comes into play in explaining ver-
bal cooperation. Though the effect is small,
11
the implication is that countries are likely to
engage in verbal cooperation with countries to
whom they they share indirect verbal or ma-
terial ties already. The same effect, however,
does not hold for material cooperation, likely
because providing material support is more
costly.
This all makes a good deal of intuitive
sense: if i and j are at a high level of conflict
on issue A, and i and k are at war on issue B,
why would we expect j and k to enter a con-
flict with one another? On the cooperative side
of things, it seems more plausible. And this is
exactly what the empirical estimates suggest.
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(c) Legend
Figure 7. B1, on left, and B2, on right. Colors are assigned to nodes by the geographic position of
countries (see Figure 7c) and links are drawn between nodes when the corresponding parameter
estimate for that i j pair is significant at a 99% credible interval. Arrows designate the direction of
the relationship. The size of nodes correspond to the number of linkages sent and received.
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5.2. B1ii′ & B2ii′
The posterior distributions of B1ii′ and B2ii′
are summarized in Figures 7a for cooperation
and 7b for the conflict models. Both these pa-
rameters contain m×m regression coefficients.
The l j coefficient in B1ii′ provides a measure
of how likely l is to send, for example, a verbal
or material cooperative event to a third party,
k, given that j has already sent a cooperative
event to k. Similarly, the l j coefficient in B2ii′
provides a measure of how likely l is to receive
a cooperative event from a third party, k, given
that j has already received a cooperative event
from k.
To visualize the posterior distributions for
these parameters, we create a set of network
plots in which linkages designate significant
positive effects using a 99% credible interval.
Nodes are replaced with three letter country
abbreviations and these pieces of text are col-
ored by the geographic location of countries
shown in Figure 7c. Results using a lower
threshold for significance lead to a large num-
ber of linkages being drawn and the plots be-
coming illegible. Additionally, very few, less
than 3%, of the l j estimates were significantly
negative, so we exclude visualizing those here
as well to improve readability.
Another important feature missing from our
visualizations of B1ii′ and B2ii′ in Figures 7a
and 7b is the diagonal elements. The diagonal
elements, in the case of B1ii′ , represent the ten-
dency of l to send a cooperative event to a third
party, given that l has done so in the past. Even
though we do not visualize those relationships
here, their effects are notable; specifically, we
find that the posterior means of the diagonal
elements of both B1ii′ and B2ii′ are approxi-
mately 10 times as large as the off-diagonal el-
ements for the cooperation model. For the con-
flict model, the diagonal elements are about 12
times as large. This result points to a certain
stickiness in how states relate to others in our
sample.
Nonetheless, there are additional findings to
be gleaned from the network visualizations we
present in Figures 7a and 7b. First, it is clear
that in each of these panels we see a noticeable
amount of geographic clustering. For exam-
ple, in the B1 posterior visualization from the
cooperative model, the Philippines (PHL) are
likely to send cooperative events to countries
that have already received cooperative ver-
bal or material support from Malaysia (MYS).
Malaysia is more likely to do the same for
countries that have received cooperative inter-
actions from Indonesia (IDN). Israel (ISR) and
Turkey (TUR) also both share this type of rela-
tionship, in that a third party that has received
a cooperative event from one has a higher of
probability receiving that type of event from
the other at a future time point as well.
This type of geographic clustering is still
apparent as we move to examining B2 from
the conflict model, shown in the right panel
of Figure 7b. Here we can see that Hungary
(HUN) is more likely to receive conflictual
events from countries that have sent those type
of events to Austria (AUT). However, there
are a number of relationships here that go be-
yond simple geographic clustering. For exam-
ple, South Africa (ZAF) is significantly more
likely to receive conflictual events from coun-
tries that have threatened India (IND); and
Argentina is more likely to receive conflict-
ual events from countries that have previously
threatened Spain.
5.3. Performance analysis
Last, we undertake an assessment of the
model’s performance. To do this, we cal-
culate the in-sample root-mean-squared error
(RMSE) for the time series of every country-
pair by variable. This generates an (m×m)−m
number of RMSE values; we visualize the re-
sults of this analysis using the surface plot
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Figure 8. Root-mean-squared error values for every directed country-pair time series.
shown in Figure 8. Here we only show results
for the conflict model – the performance of the
cooperation model is similar.
The results here highlight that the model’s
performance – particularly, for pairings in-
volving countries like France (FRA), Ger-
many (DEU), United Kingdom (GBR), and the
United States (USA) – has meaningful room
for improvement. However, the average er-
ror of the model is not large, though it does
vary substantially across dyads. For exam-
ple, the fit of the model with regards to the
largest countries is likely a result of the fact
that these countries are obviously quite dif-
ferent from others in the international system.
Thus, even with a model as detailed as that pre-
sented, there is still work to be done in con-
textualizing the interaction patterns. In future
work we hope to address issues involving the
model’s performance, by allowing it to apply
even more differentially to different types of
nation-pairs, in a kind of bloc partitioning.
Compared to the standard approaches, how-
ever, this novel approach generates a great deal
of information about dyadic interactions that
was simply lost before. Having that informa-
tion also allows us to have a better way to get
at first-order, as well as the second and third
order interactions.
6. Lessons Learned
The field of International Relations has al-
ways had big data, data that are characterized
as time-series cross-sections of relational data,
often dyads. These data structures defeat most
standard regression-based attempts to analyze
their structure. In particular, some approaches
such as latent variable models have been de-
veloped to handle the cross-sectional depen-
dence and these have been applied in some
of the literature, but ignored in much extant
work. And some approaches have focused on
the underlying structure of the time domain,
but these too have been widely ignored.
At a substantive level, we know that the
world around us is highly organized in hi-
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erarchical ways, and that some nodes are
more powerful in their interactions than oth-
ers (House & Ward, 1988a,b), but that fig-
uring this out computationally or statistically
was challenging exactly because of the depen-
dencies. At the same time, finding a way to
embed the dynamical aspect of world politics
in these frameworks was often relegated to a
simple inclusion of time counters into regres-
sion models. But the framework herein allows
this to be accomplished in a more straightfor-
ward approach that is quite familiar since it is
essential a type of regression, except with net-
work matrices stacked over time.
The substantive findings that emerge from
this suggest something both about the time de-
pendencies and the network effects that perme-
ate the ebb and flow of international politics.
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